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ABSTRACT 
The emergence of the Human Relations „School‟ of management (HRS, hereafter) in interwar America 
was less a distinct break with Taylorism or Scientific Management (SM, hereafter) than it was a right 
wing and decidedly undemocratic outgrowth. That many of Taylor‟s disciples preceded Elton Mayo in 
analysing „the human factor in industry‟ is well established in the history of management thought. 
Likewise, that the Taylorists actively sought to promote greater worker participation in the 
management process and a greater rapprochement with organised labour in the interwar period is also 
well documented. Yet the conventional wisdom in the organization studies is that HRS was the 
intellectual progeny of Mayo and his associates in the Hawthorne Studies and that their concern with 
human problems in industry was both a reaction against, and solution for the shortcomings of SM. The 
fundamental question this paper seeks to answer is why the history has been written in this way and 
how it could be that the participatory nature of Taylorist movement came to be written out of typical 
accounts. We seek to understand how and why the meta-narrative regarding SM and HRS became the 
received wisdom and who stood to gain from this establishment of managerial orthodoxy. We seek to 
understand why it was that Mayo and HRS were deified, whereas Taylor and SM were demonized in 
the 1930s and beyond. Our central argument is that HRS presented conservative business leaders such 
as John D. Rockefeller Jr. with a more subtle yet powerful means of resolving conflict and exercising 
authority in the workplace, one that focused on individuals, their productivity, and on firm performance 
rather than on collective dealing with employees and so, was more attractive to business leaders of the 
time than the more democratic approach of progressive figures in the SM movement. 
Key Words: Scientific Management; Taylorism; Human Relations; Elton Mayo; John D. Rockefeller 
Jr.; Industrial Democrac 
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“All history is the history of thought” said the philosopher of history, R.G. 
Collingwood and so, history is actually the re-enactment - in the mind of the historian 
- of the thought whose history is under scrutiny. This reconstitution governs the 
selection and interpretation of „facts‟ and is, indeed, what makes them „historical 
facts‟ (Carr 1967). Accordingly, all understandings of management thought are 
shaped by historiographical processes and these processes are shaped by prevailing 
power relations and attendant ideologies (Cooke 1999). For this reason, the standard 
depiction of Human Relations „school‟ of management (HRS, hereafter) „rising out of 
the ashes‟ of Taylorism or Scientific Management (SM, hereafter) is a rhetorical 
distortion of historical events that cannot be reduced to the mere desire for simpler 
and smoother historical narrative concerning the development of management 
thinking, however pedagogically noble this might be. Rather, and to paraphrase 
Jenkins (1991), this depiction, like all historical accounts, is „not for itself, but always 
for someone‟. Further, 
particular social formations want their historians to deliver 
particular things. (P)redominantly delivered positions will be in the 
interests of those stronger ruling blocs within social formations… . 
The fact that history per se is an ideological construct means that it 
is constantly being re-worked and re-ordered by all those who are 
variously affected by power relationships (Jenkins 1991: 17).  
 
How the history of SM and HRS has been hitherto presented obfuscates the fact that 
HRS presented managers with a more subtle yet powerful means of resolving conflict 
and exercising authority in the workplace, one that focused on individuals, their 
productivity, and on firm performance rather than on collective dealing with 
employees and so, was more attractive to business leaders of the time. But the 
question begs to be asked: more attractive than what? In other words, less well-
documented is what actually prompted this rhetorical strategy viz. the nature of the 
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existential context in which Elton Mayo‟s (and his collaborators‟) particular 
knowledge claims are developed. What was Mayo reacting against? Why does Mayo 
say what he says, to the audience he says it to, at the particular time he says it? These 
are critical questions that we hope to provide answers for below. 
The central purpose of the paper is to understand how and why the meta-
narrative regarding SM and HRS became the received wisdom and who stood to gain 
from this establishment of managerial orthodoxy. This discursive exercise allows us, 
as Townley (1993) has earlier urged, to analyse the rules of formation of a discourse 
concerning SM and HRS; an analysis of the situations provoking the discourse, the 
consequences to which it gives rise, the institutional sites from which it derives its 
legitimation and the position in which it places its subjects. Our central argument in 
this project is that HRS presented conservative business leaders with a more subtle yet 
powerful means of exercising authority which could counter the more democratic 
approach of progressive figures in the SM movement seeking to enable workers to 
become more active participants in the labour process. In this context we must realise, 
as Phillips-Fein (2006: 693) notes, that business people are not “neutral and rational 
figures” and if we study their “political mobilization” we see they are “political actors 
who are influenced by ideologies as well as by their immediate interests”. In this 
paper, we seek to understand why extant historical accounts of SM and HR have not 
told the story in this manner. How could it be that the democratic and participatory 
nature of the Taylorist movement came to be written out of this history? In other 
words, we investigate how and why Mayo and HRS came to be deified, whereas 
Taylor and SM were demonized in the 1930s and beyond. We also demonstrate, as 
does Roper (1995), that apparent paradigm shifts occur through the vilification of 
elevated figures; he argues that the vilification of Taylor and SM in the 1950s and 60s 
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was an attempt by the behaviouralist social scientists to assert their claim for 
reputational authority and legitimacy in the emergent academic (rather than 
practitioner-based) field of management theory. 
The paper is organised as follows. We begin by reminding the reader that 
progressive Taylorism actively sought to democratize management as well as promote 
rapprochement with organised labour in the interwar period and beyond, which deeply 
disturbed conservative business interests and made them more amenable to the 
philosophies and tactics advocated by the HRS. We then demonstrate Mayo‟s 
awareness of the democratic appeal of SM and then focus on what Mayo was 
„selling‟, who he was selling it to, and how he was able to „sell‟ these ideas to those 
that „bought‟ them. In particular, we explore the impact on Mayo‟s rhetorical strategy 
of having John D. Rockefeller Jr. (JDR Jr., hereafter) as his financial and professional 
benefactor for the entirety of his career. In conclusion, we bring together these strands 
in order to shed some light on how and why the meta-narrative regarding SM and 
HRS became the received wisdom and who stood to gain; namely conservative, anti-
liberal segments of the American business community seeking a return to the 
managerial hegemony they believed they enjoyed in the pre-New Deal era (Harris 
1982).  
 
What was Mayo reacting to? Scientific Management and Industrial Democracy 
Regardless of the scientific rigour or legitimacy of the Hawthorne studies or 
his precise role therein, one of Mayo and HRS‟ central achievements was to bring 
people‟s social needs into the limelight and thereby increase their capacity for 
collaboration at work. Under HRS, employees would obtain the identity, stability, and 
satisfaction that would make them more willing to cooperate and contribute their 
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efforts toward accomplishing organizational goals. Motivation is less about “logical” 
financial incentives, as largely emphasized by SM, and more about management 
meeting these “nonlogical” social, “belonging” needs of people (Wren 2005; Wren 
and Greenwood 1998; Kaufman 2000b, 2004, 2008). However, this view must be 
tempered with the well-documented fact that Mayo and HRS also provided 
conservative business leaders with an attractive package of ideas and practices for 
ameliorating labour discontent whilst simultaneously precluding any role for 
industrial democracy or employee voice of any kind (Rose 1978; Hurd 1987; Miller 
and O‟Leary 1989; Miller and Rose 1990; Steffy and Grimes 1992; Miller and Rose 
1992; Rose 1998; O‟Connor 1999a, 1999b; Taras 2000). Less well-documented, 
however, is what actually prompted this rhetorical strategy viz. the nature of the 
social and intellectual context in which Mayo‟s (and his collaborators‟) particular 
knowledge claims developed. What was he reacting against? Why does he say what 
he says, to the audience he says it to, at the particular time he says it? 
The most recent and thorough attempt to answer these questions, that of Ellen 
O‟Connor (1999a, 1999b, 1999c), posits that Mayo‟s rhetorical strategy was what it 
was in order to win support from big business by ameliorating their fear of socialist 
ideas and practices, a genuine concern in interwar America, with the very legitimacy 
of the US economic and political order at stake. Mayo did this, she argues, by 
equating collective bargaining with class war and criticizing mass democracy as 
“socialistic” – “the kiss of death as far as businessmen were concerned” (O‟Connor 
1999b: 230) – thereby discrediting calls for industrial democracy, initiatives very 
unpalatable to conservative big business. “Mayo had found a way”, she notes further, 
“to alleviate worker satisfaction without altering the balance of power or raising 
wages”; a way to “remedy workplace conflict so that workers would be happier and 
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thus not join unions” (O‟Connor 1999b: 227; 236). In this way, she concludes, both 
HRS and the Harvard Business School accumulated power.   
But the question begs to be asked: power over who or what? We believe she 
does not provide wholly adequate answers to this pivotal question. Power is always 
relational, so presently we will explore how and why HRS accumulated power over 
the rival research programme of the time, Taylorism or SM. For instance, in the 
context of industrial democracy though she mentions Ordway Tead, Mary Parker 
Follett, and Mary Van Kleeck, she does not underscore that they belonged to a 
progressive arm of the SM movement in the Taylor Society - about which more will 
be said below - striving for workers to become more active participants in the 
management of the labour process and attempting a greater rapprochement with 
organised labour. Further, and following the leads of Bourke (1982), though 
O‟Connor analyses the Australian origins of Mayo‟s evolving HR ideas, neither 
satisfactorily explore the critical impact thereupon of attitudes towards SM or 
Taylorism during Mayo‟s early Australian career.  
So what was the attitude towards SM in Australia prior to Mayo‟s departure 
for the USA?  Before turning to this, a quick observation about SM per se is in order. 
Taylor‟s desire to rationalise production in the interests of efficiency and mutual 
prosperity centred on the individual worker pursuing individual goals, motivated by 
incentive payments, and so, his view of human motivation was somewhat simplistic; 
his view of human nature was somewhat inhumane; and his sensitivity to the 
importance of groups was generally negative. Accordingly, and notwithstanding an 
extensive revisionist history of SM and Taylorism, the received wisdom is largely an 
uncritical and somewhat unfounded equation of SM with labour deskilling, anti-
unionism, and the elitist exclusion of employees from workplace decision-making 
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(Kaufman 2004). To be sure, there were abuses of Taylor‟s “system” and the bulk of 
the SM movement were conservative engineers and businesspeople with little concern 
for industrial democracy. Yet revisionist historians have unearthed the existence of a 
progressive wing of the SM movement, rooted mainly in the Taylor Society, an 
epistemic community devoted to democratizing and humanizing SM and enriching 
Taylor‟s ideas, certainly the most liberal management association in the interwar 
period (Kaufman 2008). Their research clearly points to an indisputable fact that 
Mayo would have been well aware of prior to his departure from Australia in 1922: 
that some of Taylor’s closest disciples in the progressive wing of the SM movement 
publicly strived for greater democracy in the workplace, espoused the virtues of 
collective bargaining and union-management cooperation, and actively sustained an 
alliance with organised labour that centred on what today we would term a mutual-
gains strategy (Nadworny 1955; Scheinberg 1966; Fraser 1991; Harris 1993; 
McCartin 1997; Nyland 1998; Gabor 2000; Brody 2001; Kaufman 2004, 2008; 
Nyland and Heenan 2005; Nyland and McLeod 2007). Moreover, and during the same 
period, the more progressive-minded Taylorists also forged a collaborative 
association with international organised labour’s peak body, the International 
Labour Organisation, that similarly sought to democratise the management process 
and promote tripartite forms of participatory management (Nyland and Bruce 2009). 
We believe these head-on challenges to managerial hegemony, by appealing for 
greater democracy in the workplace, were the pivotal element of SM that Mayo was 
reacting to in his emerging HR ideas and, so, perhaps the central contributory factor to 
the demonization of SM the 1930s and beyond.  
In her able work analysing Mayo‟s Australian writings, Bourke (1982) notes 
that much of his knowledge claims concerning the primacy of psycho-social context 
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rather than collective bargaining, employee councils, arbitration and “narrowly 
economic approaches to work and its rewards” as a solution to labour-management 
problems, was shaped by his reactions against the Australian labour movement. In 
particular, his critique of democracy (particularly that in industry), as well as his 
rhetorical strategy of conceptualisation of industrial unrest as a social pathology, was 
a direct consequence of his experience of industrial disputes and his involvement in 
worker education. She also asserts that Mayo‟s ideas concerning the primacy of a 
managerial elite as saviour in industrial relations, a point to which we will return 
below, though developed in the USA, was also well formed before his departure to the 
USA in 1922.
 
What she does not appreciate, though, is the mood of the times vis-à-vis 
SM and Taylorism: like other labour movements around the world, Australian 
organised labour fundamentally reappraised their initial hostility to Taylorism in the 
wake of the SM movement‟s involvement in studies of how improvements in 
industrial efficiency could be achieved by the rationalisation of working time (Nyland 
1987).  
Further, it must be emphasised that the same demands for industrial 
democracy in the USA that shaped Mayo‟s evolving HR thinking were the echoes of 
earlier calls in Australia amidst widespread post-WWI industrial unrest. A massive 
strike wave in 1919 prompted employers to develop a more conciliatory attitude to 
unions, as well as engage in discussions of industrial democracy. Above all else, it 
was widely feared that the same socialistic spectre haunting the USA and Europe 
threatened the very foundations of Australian capitalistic system of production and 
distribution and so, the system needed to be rationalised along the lines suggested by 
the Taylorists in the USA. Reform measures touted included material improvements 
in workers‟ living standards and, important for our argument, a democratization of the 
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production process (Nyland 1987). As in the USA, this negative correlation between 
workers‟ calls for industry democracy and the threat of socialism would prove to be 
pivotal in Mayo‟s HR knowledge claims.  
 
Mayo’s Rhetorical Strategy  
Given the Taylorists‟ détente with organised labour and their call for greater 
worker „voice‟ in the labour process in the interwar period, it was important that 
Mayo paint a particular picture of workers that might somehow preclude the need for 
management to bargain with them along the lines eschewed by progressive Taylorists. 
So it was, therefore, he would portray workers as irrational, agitation-prone masses 
susceptible to “socialistic” ideas and championed the need for a managerial elite to 
govern them - a very attractive proposition to conservative big business who felt their 
authority under threat in the immediate postwar period onwards. As Harris (1982: 6; 
italics in original) observes: 
Their authority was challenged, their power over their own 
employees and factories threatened. The scale and severity of the 
new problems of labor relations may have been exaggerated…but 
businessmen undeniably had reason to be worried, and to act to 
oppose and contain a dangerous and undersirable movement of 
concerted protest. 
 
JDR Jr. certainly acted: he bankrolled a massive corpus of industrial relations 
research in industry and in universities, and so, has been labelled (alongside the 
Webbs and John Commons) as a co-founder of the field of industrial relations 
(Kaufman 2004). He also became Mayo‟s financial and professional benefactor 
(Fisher 1983; Trahair 1984; Harvey 1988; Gillespie 1991; Magat 1999; O‟Connor 
1999a; Bottom 2006) and the “vital core of Rockefeller finance of social science work 
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seems to have been the work of Elton Mayo at Harvard” (Bulmer and Bulmer 1981: 
20). 
Either through his family‟s various philanthropic foundations or through his 
own personal wealth, JDR Jr. and his philanthropic network funded Mayo‟s salary 
initially at Wharton and then again at Harvard; he either personally or via corporate 
contacts arranged access to firms for Mayo‟s industrial research (including the 
Hawthorne plant); and again, either personally or through contacts, JDR Jr. 
continually assured Mayo a receptive audience for his evolving HR ideas. 
“Rockefeller‟s network paid HBS for Mayo‟s expenses, connected him to the ongoing 
Hawthorne Studies, and publicized his research team‟s analysis” (Bottom 2006: 29). 
Further, as Harvey (1982: 21-22) observes: 
For this kind of “scientific” analysis of blue collar blues cum 
revolution. John D. Rockefeller, Jr., spent a great deal of money to 
solve the problems of the social relationships at the center of the 
economic system. …This approach was certainly better from every 
point of view than the pre-Ludlow use of physical violence to 
maintain the power of capital over labor.  
 
These are crucial points because they highlight the enormous power JDR Jr. 
wielded over Mayo, particularly since the latter was never a salaried faculty member 
at Harvard. As Baritz (1960: 196; 198; parentheses added) noted in this context: 
Management…controlled the industrial social scientists in its 
employ. … Managers…had the power to hire and fire social 
scientists. If a social scientist was to be kept on the payroll, he had 
to produce. The judge of whether he was producing was his boss. 
His boss was interested in the specific problems of the business 
including those that threatened managerial control. …Reducing the 
pressures of unionism while increasing the productivity of the labor 
force and thereby lowering costs have been their (industrial social 
scientists) most cherished goals, because these have been the goals 
which management has set for them.  
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The immense pressure to achieve demonstrable results to please his patron 
would play a significant role in the development of Mayo‟s ideas (Fisher 1983; 
Gillespie 1991); namely, we believe it would very much shape his rhetorical strategy 
to one that would preclude bargaining or dialogue with workers or in any way 
jeopardise management hegemony.  
It is interesting at this juncture to briefly contrast the philanthropic interest in 
Mayo and HRS with that shown to SM and Taylorism which, after immense initial 
interest and funding, cooled substantially in the late 1920s following the Taylorists‟ 
evolving embrace of industrial democracy, worker dissatisfaction, and 
unemployment. As Magat (1999: 62) notes: 
The Rockefeller Foundation‟s Fosdick and the LSRM‟s Ruml 
refused to include funding for the Taylor Society among programs 
aiming to apply scientific inquiry to social issues. In a strenuous 
effort to return to the center of scientific social reform, the [Taylor] 
Society staged a major dinner conference in 1927 to which leading 
social investigators, journalists, and officials of the eight leading 
foundations were invited. Only Russell Sage officials attended.  
 
Most importantly neither Fosdick nor Ruml attended this dinner, nor did the 
American Federation of Labor‟s Hugh Frayne, which was particularly damaging 
because the organisers wished to impress upon foundation officials that they actively 
courted close cooperation between labour and capital under contemporary Taylorism, 
as documented in the previous section (Jordan 1994). In sum, because of its 
gravitation toward industrial democracy and a dialogue with organised labour,  
the Taylor Society won neither grants nor the opportunity to 
coordinate the movement toward social rationalization. The 
Rockefeller Foundation, the agency most likely to back [Harlow] 
Person [Managing Director of the Society], continued to focus its 
attention on established academic and institutional ventures in 
social invesitgation throughout the 1930s. Because the Rockefeller 
Foundation discards unsuccessful grant applications after a few 
years, and because foundation support had become a prerequisite 
for credibility, the Taylor Dinner affords the historian a rare chance 
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to see one of the roads not taken toward the rationalized social 
reform (Jordan 1994: 205; parentheses added). 
 
Returning to our story, how precisely did Mayo‟s rhetorical strategy evolve 
and how was it legitimised? Turning to the first of these questions, Mayo‟s first 
serious applied work in industrial psychology in the US, conducted on behalf of the 
Wharton School between 1923-1925 in Philadelphia, was financed by Rockefeller 
from his own personal funds following difficulties convincing the trustees of the 
foundation established in his mother‟s memory of the importance of Mayo‟s work 
(Bulmer and Bulmer 1981). Linking medical and industrial institutions won Mayo the 
enthusiasm of key Rockefeller foundation heads, particularly Laura Spelman 
Rockefeller Memorial (LSRM, hereafter) director, Beardsley Ruml and tied in closely 
with JDR Jr.‟s concern with industrial relations (Bulmer and Bulmer 1981). So, from 
the outset and through much of his published work in this period, Mayo‟s rhetoric was 
unquestionably geared to what his patron might want to “hear”; viz. he consistently 
paints a picture of workers as irrational, agitation-prone masses susceptible to 
“socialistic” radicalism and so, unfit for “voice” in the workplace. Mayo‟s sequence 
of argument ran roughly as follows: the industrial unrest of his time was caused by 
“factors of unreason” or “factors of irrationality” and this irrationality amongst 
workers was the product of “disassociated” or “obsessional reveries”. Applying the 
new medical psychology, he likened workers to „shell-shocked‟ soldiers in need of 
serious psychological/psychiatric attention. Most important here, is the fact Mayo 
dismisses workers‟ calls for better wages and conditions and a “voice” over same as 
“socialistic radicalism” and as symptomatic of some deeper psychosocial 
maladjustment. The way forward, he concluded, was not improved wages and 
conditions and industrial democracy, but instead, the type of industrial psychological 
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research he was presently engaged in (Mayo 1923a, 1923b, 1924a, 1924b, 1926). As 
we will see in more depth below, more democracy for Mayo was a negative 
development as he believed “Democracy has possibly been responsible for a decrease 
in respect of statesmanship” and that “emotional organisation of an irrational type has 
been encouraged rather than diminished by democracy” (Mayo 1924d: 2-3).  
This rhetoric pervades much, if not all, of his Wharton writings. He argues 
repeatedly that “factors of unreason play a part in every industrial dispute” (Mayo 
1923b) and further, in the popular Harper’s Magazine, that the “unreason which 
shows itself in industry and in political movements is closely akin to the unreason 
which showed itself in shell-shock hospitals” (Mayo 1924a: 529). In an unpublished 
memo to Beardsley Ruml, Mayo notes that “wars and strikes (are) never the product 
of a sudden and unexpected irrationality. Always (like a nervous breakdown) the 
product of a long „education‟ in irrationality – that is to say, always the product of 
imperfect understanding and organised opposition (so-called „democratic‟ method‟). 
This is clearly evident in Australia as here” (Mayo 1924d: 6-7). This “unreason” or 
“irrationality” he widely associates with “pessimistic or dissociated reveries” induced 
by work conditions which he believes can only “culminate in disorder and unrest 
(absenteeism, high labor turnover, strikes)” (Mayo 1924c: 256) or worse, that 
“Socialism, Syndicalism, and Bolshevism - irrational dreams of anger and destruction 
– are the inevitable outcome” (Mayo 1924a: 123).  
Further, in an unpublished letter in 1923, he conveyed his belief that 
“(s)ocialism is a disassociated reverie in that workers have failed to achieve self-
expression and control over their destiny and have substituted for such development a 
reverie, an imagined social situation, in which the individual worker is free to direct  
his life work” (Mayo to Willits 1923, Mayo Papers: Box 1c, f. 75. Baker Library, 
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Harvard Business School). As for the way forward, Mayo sums up his arguments 
thus:  
In every individual there are incompletely developed capacities – 
fears and hatreds – which go undetected…To these irrational 
preoccupations in the supposedly normal may be attributed the 
great mass of industrial maladjustment and both organized and 
unorganized industrial discontent. „Radicalism‟ in all its forms is 
primarily a problem for psychiatry; its economic aspect is of 
secondary importance. …(T)he psychiatrist is the only person who 
knows how to assess the organic and mental symptoms in such 
situations. And the study is so important from a merely industrial 
point of view that any other contemporary economic activity pales 
into insignificance. It is here or nowhere that the problems of 
industrial peace will be solved (Mayo 1926).  
 
The key point, as Gillespie (1991: 105) observes, is that Mayo must have 
found it enormously problematic to remain impartial and balance a theoretical 
commitment to criticize both workers and employers as being “irrational” with the 
fact that he was dependent on employers for access to their factories. So it was, 
therefore, that he painted “(s)trikes and the political disturbances of mass 
democracy…not (as) the rational attempts to gain an increase in wages, (but) as 
expressions of underlying reveries, and it was these reveries that had to be addressed, 
not the political demands or „symptoms‟”(Gillespie 1991: 105; parentheses added). 
Mayo cleverly simply reinterpreted the political stances of aggrieved workers as 
merely symptomatic manifestations of some underlying personal maladjustments 
(Gillespie 1991).  
The Rockefeller Network  
In answering the second key question posed above – how did Mayo legitimise 
this rhetorical strategy? – we need to consider the related issues of who he was „selling‟ 
his ideas to, and how he was able to „sell‟ these ideas to those that „bought‟ them. 
Following his work for the Wharton School, Mayo began publicly proselytizing on the 
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benefits of industrial psychology. In terms of the evolution of HRS thought, if we 
consider Mayo‟s work throughout the mid-1920s up to the publication of the Human 
Problems of Industry in 1933, we see that it was neither terribly path-breaking nor 
foundational. In many respects it was not all that unlike much of the work conducted 
by the Taylorists and others before him. His central concern during this period was 
with the relationship between fatigue and productivity and, using the human pulse rate 
as a proxy, with measuring „organic fitness‟ and fatigue. In fact, it was not until he 
published Human Problems and later still, after Roethlisberger and Dickson‟s account 
of the Hawthorne studies in their 1939 Management and the Worker, that the central 
tenets of Mayo‟s contributions to HRS were formally articulated (Bruce 2006). 
In the public domain at least, there was very little discussion by Mayo of his 
correlation between workers‟ calls for industrial democracy and their perceived 
irrationality and maladjustment. Crucial for Mayo‟s ability to reach a receptive 
audience, we believe, first, were his known roles with Rockefeller-owned big 
businesses, as well as their professional think-tanks, particularly the clandestine 
Special Conference Committee (SCC, hereafter) and also Industrial Relations 
Counselors (IRC, hereafter). Particularly important in the context of the latter was his 
friendship with IRC head, Arthur H. Young. The second means of securing an 
audience was his pivotal role in the fledgling Harvard executive education program, at 
the so-called „Cabot Weekends‟. Regardless of Mayo‟s motives, “what mattered was 
that were was an audience of social scientists, foundation officials, corporate 
executives, and managers ready to listen to and support Mayo‟s approach”. His mild 
criticism of them was “the prelude to a program offering them more efficient 
techniques of control” (Gillespie 1991: 110).  
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As far as a receptive audience is concerned, a propitious place to begin is with 
the covert SCC, which had close personal, philosophical, and financial links to JDR 
Jr. (Kaufman 2008). Formed in 1919 and including top executives from big 
businesses including General Electric, General Motors, Du Pont, AT&T, Bethlehem 
Steel, and US Steel, the SCC was a quasi-organised confederation to pool ideas and 
policies in the promotion of company employee representation as a means to avoid 
„outside‟ trade unions and government regulation, as well as to stabilise workplace 
relations. While Kaufman (2004) observes that SCC member companies certainly 
possessed the desire to avoid AF of L-style craft unionism and the closed shop, and 
that the SCC annual reports and few surviving records provide almost no evidence of 
direct anti-unionism, the bulk of the literature regards the SCC as a vehicle to 
preserve the open shop and employers‟ „right to manage‟. The SCC promoted 
company unions as a means to make management authority more legitimate and more 
effective without limiting the prerogatives of ownership and management or altering 
the essential purposes of the enterprise (Scheinberg 1966; Harris 1993; McCartin 
1997). Indicative of the SCC‟s stance on industrial democracy is a confidential memo 
from archival sources penned by a Du Pont industrial relations executive appraising 
the company union scheme at a Standard Oil refinery installed by Clarence Hicks, 
chief John D. Rockefeller, Jr.‟s industrial relations aide and SCC chairman from 1919 
to 1931: 
This, clearly, is not industrial democracy. It is instead clever 
humbug. …(T)he absolute veto power rests with the Company. …I 
have no doubt that the employee thinks he is [acquiring] a voice in 
management and that the operation of the whole scheme promotes 
cordial relations between employer and employee. As practised at 
Bayonne, the scheme is entirely inocuous [sic] insofar as denager 
to the Company‟s established labor policies are concerned (cited in 
Brody 2001: 363).  
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While the SCC was an organisation of the big business elite, the IRC evolved 
as the organisation for the elite. Financed chiefly by JDR Jr. and founded in 1926, 
IRC superseded the law firm of his chief in-house counsel, Raymond Fosdick, of 
Curtis, Fosdick and Belknap. IRC was headed by Arthur H. Young, formerly a 
Colorado Fuel and Iron (CFI, hereafter) manager and the methods and philosophy 
developed at IRC were those employed by Mackenzie King and Clarence Hicks viz. 
Rockefeller-style company unionism. IRC purported to “advance the knowledge and 
practice of human relations in industry, commerce, education, and government” and 
promulgated a position of a “win-win” between employers and employees, of greater 
efficiency and harmony founded on a philosophy of greater cooperation and unity of 
interest through joint dealing via non-union system of employee representation and 
other welfare capitalism measures. In this way, Kaufman (2003a) regards IRC as a 
spokesman for and representative of the liberal/progressive arm of US business. 
Others, though, believe their outlook was very much a unitarist solution rather than a 
pluralist one and reflected Rockefeller‟s ambivalent feelings towards union forms of 
collective bargaining (Harvey 1988; Brody 2001; Patmore 2007), a point to which we 
will return in the next section. 
To appreciate the IRC‟s stance towards independent trade unions and 
collective bargaining –reflective of the Hicks- King-JDR Jr. approach in general – we 
need do little more than consider two confidential memos involving some of JDR Jr.‟s 
closest legal advisors. The first, dated December 15, 1923, was from an industrial 
relations investigator, Charles M. Mills, addressed to George J. Anderson, formerly 
head of the industrial relations annex of Curtis, Fosdick and Belknap, the 
organizational precursor of IRC. Mills‟ memo concerned a survey he had made of 
employee representation plans in five Rockefeller-owned oil companies. Of Standard 
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Oil (New Jersey) and Standard Oil (Indiana) he reported that “these companies have 
never recognized trade unions as collective groups for bargaining or making 
contracts”, whilst in Standard Oil (New York) “the spirit and attitude of the leading 
executives is anti-union, and even anti-industrial representation. The policy is strictly 
individual bargaining. …A union man is absolutely personal non grata, and is even 
discharged after hiring, if his identity becomes known” (Mills to Anderson 1923, 
RFA Friends and Services Series, Box 62, Folder 469, RAC; italics added). He goes 
on to note that “these policies raise far-reaching questions. Do the Industrial 
Representation Plans and other features of the Standard Oil labor program tend to take 
the place of unionism and resist its encroachment?” (Mills to Anderson 1923). He 
answers his own question as follows: 
The labor policies in the Standard Oil companies have 
unequestionably offset attempts at unionism during the last ten 
years. Any company which keeps one step ahead of the demands 
commonly put forward by unions, is not so vulnerable to the first 
line of attack by unions. … 
Therefore, every feature of a labor policy or a labor program which 
eliminates the more common causes of union organization, 
weakens the inroads of unionism.  
There is surely one central feature that no company plan has yet 
provided. I refer to the power of real collective bargaining. …The 
problem of the future is to put the power of real collective 
bargaining into the industrial representation plan, and so 
counterbalance the threat of unionism in this direction (Mills to 
Anderson 1923, emphasis in original).  
 
The second memo is from Raymond Fosdick to JDR Jr. in March 22 1934 
regarding the latter‟s continued financing of IRC. He writes: 
One of my responsibilities in the 21 years in which I have been 
associated with you has been to point out possible dangers ahead in 
connection with your multifarious interests. The country is at the 
moment witnessing a head-on collision between the labor union 
and the company union. Your position has always been clear, i.e., 
that you stood for adequate representation no matter whether it was 
by one method or another. We have always tried to hold the scales 
evenly as far as the management of IRC was concerned, and we 
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have friends on both sides of the fence. …Mr Hicks with entire 
frankness has pointed out to me that the very nature of the work of 
IRC implies a sympathy toward the company union which, as an 
organization, we do not have toward the labor union. If this is true 
– and I fear it may be – it is possible that the charge might be made 
that you were financing an organization to fight union labor, and 
you might thereby be maneuvered into an uncomfortable public 
position (Fosdick to JDR Jr 1934. RFA Economic Interest Series, 
Box 16, Folder 127, RAC).  
 
JDR Jr. subsequently scaled back his financing of IRC and grants to IRC 
ceased altogether towards the end of the 1930s, though this might also have been 
related to JDR Jr.‟s belief that IRC had proven its value and could generate sufficient 
revenue to be self-supporting (Kaufman 2003a).  
As far as Mayo‟s connection with IRC is concerned, in October 1927 IRC 
head Arthur Young arranged for Mayo to address a group of industrialists concerning 
what psychology could offer industry. This actually set in motion Mayo‟s 
involvement in the Hawthorne Studies (Smith 1985). Precisely a year later in October 
1928, he was commissioned by JDR Jr. – via Young - to research ongoing industrial 
relations problems at CFI and, in particular, to investigate “possible causes of 
improper functioning of the Industrial Plan and the possible use of forces to bring 
about a more cooperative relationship between management and employees.” 
Unsurprisingly, Mayo was critical of the aforementioned 1924 investigation of the 
Rockefeller Plan – conducted by the Taylorists, Ben Selekman and Mary Van Kleeck 
for the Russell Sage Foundation - and also of enquiries into industrial democracy in 
general. Mayo was of the view that if industrial relations were cooperative, workers 
could make constructive suggestions, but that these should be evaluated correctly by 
management. Mayo reported his findings in a 1929 letter to Arthur Woods, a former 
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CFI vice-president and also president of the LSRM fund that was paying his Harvard 
salary and who had, in fact, known Mayo since his Wharton days.  
As ever, in this letter Mayo alluded to workers‟ “morbid preoccupation with 
personal issues as between worker representatives and local management”. He further 
reported that “the type of solution proposed [to the ongoing industrial relations 
problems at CFI] was also essentially morbid – viz. the solution suggested was to the 
effect that the words and phrases of the Plan should be made to exert a constraining 
influence on management” (Mayo to Colonel Arthur Woods, Mayo Papers Box 3b, f. 
18, Baker Library, Harvard Business School). Further, of the 1924 Selekman and Van 
Kleeck studies which concluded that the Colorado Plan would fail “unless the men 
throughout the industry as a whole secure adequate and effective representation”, 
Mayo noted he was “unable to accept the assumptions of the investigators of the 
Russell Sage Foundation” (Mayo to Colonel Arthur Woods). The reality is that Mayo 
really could not reach any other conclusion, given that both Selekman and Van 
Kleeck personally, as well as their studies, had been severely criticized by the 
president of the CFI company, by Mackenzie King, by all of JDR Jr.‟s legal advisors, 
and most importantly, by JDR Jr. himself! (Gitelman 1988). In this context and of 
particular importance is Mayo‟s discussion of Van Kleeck‟s emphasis on industrial 
democracy: 
There is another difficulty for me in Miss Van Kleeck‟s approach 
to the investigation – she seems to assume that a “democratic” 
method of managing industry is necessarily appropriate. …If it 
means that industry is to develop a two-party system and to 
determine any issues that arise by discussion and compromise then 
it would seem that such a method would revive and accentuate a 
situation of class conflict. This is indeed exactly what has 
happened in Australia – the country that has provided a “shocking 
example” of how things should not be done in industry (Mayo to 
Colonel Arthur Woods). 
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This statement is important because it brings into sharp relief Mayo‟s 
opposition to industrial democracy as espoused by the progressive arm of the 
Taylorists, as well as presaging his theory of democracy privileging a minority elite 
leadership and precluding the need for mass participation in political, economic or 
management decisions beyond those at the ballot box, a point to which we will return 
below. 
Two months after the Colorado study, Mayo received a retainer from IRC and 
as something of a quid pro quo Young was invited to lecture at the Harvard Business 
School. Thereafter, Mayo and Young became close friends, and Mayo benefited 
greatly from the connections made through Young. Mayo accompanied Young to 
Geneva as an “expert industrial relations advisor” when IRC established a branch at 
the ILO. Young, in fact, was a crucial bridge and broker between Mayo and JDR Jr. in 
that he drew Mayo into the inner circle of industrial relations executives of major 
corporations, fostered his involvement in the Hawthorne studies, and ensured Western 
Electric and AT&T executives understood the importance of Mayo‟s research 
(Trahair 1984; Smith 1987). Mayo‟s involvement with the Hawthorne studies was 
attractive to Rockefeller (and other) philanthropy officers because this research 
promised “a technology of social control that could confront problems of industrial 
unrest and individual maladjustments among workers” (Gillespie 1991: 112-113).  
The second means by which Mayo managed to secure an audience and „sell‟ 
his emerging HR ideas, was via his extensive involvement in the so-called „Cabot 
Weekends‟, which were a series of executive education training workshops organised 
by Mayo‟s Harvard colleague, Philip Cabot, held for one weekend a month, beginning 
in January 1935 and ending in December 1941. Invited to these workshops were 
young executives - the future captains of industry and finance - from America‟s 
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largest corporations, including Western Electric, AT&T, Standard Oil, Nabisco, J.P. 
Morgan, American Tobacco, Du Pont, IBM, and US Steel (Cabot Papers, c. 5, f. 169. 
Baker Library, Harvard Business School). In practice, the Cabot Weekends were just 
one part of a particular model of leadership training emphasised by Dean Donham, 
focusing on business managers as elites or statesmen presiding over a rapidly 
deteriorating society (Cruickshank 1987). This view received particular impetus from 
Donham‟s involvement in the Harvard Pareto Circle who, as an epistemic community, 
felt the need to defend capitalism against socialistic threats and who invoked Pareto 
specifically to counter Marx (O‟Connor 2008a). Given that the subject matter of the 
Cabot weekends were about clarifying social and human problems in industry, Cabot 
shaped many of these meetings around talks by Mayo and Roethlisberger, and 
subsequently other HRS figures such as T. N. Whitehead and George Lombard, 
particularly as “…the enthusiastic response by businessmen toward the Hawthorne 
findings suggested that the School might pursue new directions in executive 
education” (Cruickshank 1987: 190; Trahair 1984). As Roethlisberger (1977, 86-87) 
notes, “Cabot at this time must have felt that Mayo‟s diagnosis of the ills of modern 
industrial civilization wanted an audience of responsible businessmen. He brought 
together some the outstanding business leaders of the time and brought them Mayo in 
person”. Mayo himself notes, in a letter to Donham in 1937: 
Cabot‟s original idea was that very considerable social changes are 
in process; the capacity of society to adjust itself to such changes 
without serious damage, without loss of order, will be determined 
by the adequacy and courage of our leaders…developed only by 
experience, knowledge of fact and situation, and intelligent 
understanding.  
(Accordingly), Cabot has been driven to make even more use of the 
services of my immediate colleagues and of the ideas which the 
group is developing as a result of its investigations (Mayo Papers, 
c. 2, f. 2; parentheses added. Baker Library, Harvard Business 
School). 
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This is an important point, because the Hawthorne researchers and HRS took 
for granted the necessity of complete managerial hegemony in the workplace. As 
Gillespie (1991: 268) notes, “Human Relations became an attractive ideology for a 
technocractic and managerial class trying to reconcile its expanded power with the 
principles of liberal democracy”. In this way, Mayo made a strong case that his ideas 
and methods would develop the requisite managerial elite needed to save civilisation 
by training these leaders at Harvard (O‟Connor 1999b). As he asserted, “Human 
Relations, in the form of skills taught to business leaders and administrators, could 
ensure social collaboration in the factory and in society at large and win the war 
against Communism” (1949, cited in Gillespie 1991: 246).  
 
JDR Jr., Mayo, Unions and Industrial Democracy 
As it was for other conservative business leaders of the time, Mayo and HRS 
was music to the ears of America‟s “capitalist-prince” and the heir to the world‟s 
largest fortune, JDR Jr., particularly since the latter was decidely interested in fending 
off the Bolshevik threat of socialism in the USA (Gitelman 1988). Yet, and as 
observed above, at the same time, it was a familiar melody that he himself helped 
compose by sponsoring Mayo‟s HRS research at Wharton and then at Harvard, as 
well as providing Mayo with the necessary network to diffuse his HRS knowledge-
claims (Domhoff 1990). JDR Jr. may have been out of his depth in managing the 
corporate side of the family dynasty, but he was completely on-top of the 
philanthropic arm (Gitelman 1988) and in Mayo and HRS, JDR Jr. saw the potential 
to produce and publicise the “human face” of American capitalism, and so, perpetuate 
his belief that he and his family were stewards of a divine trust. Both Mayo and JDR 
Jr. shared the view that the scale and scope of business had grown so large that the 
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personal relationships that once prevailed in business had been lost such that 
employers and employees found themselves divided by an ever-widening gulf of 
misunderstanding and mistrust (Gitelman 1988). Continuing the earlier analogy, 
Mayo simply and shrewdly tuned into what he believed his benefactor wanted to hear 
in terms of JDR Jr.‟s publicly aired belief in corporate stewardship, as well as his 
privately held antipathy to industrial democracy personified by collective bargaining 
with „outside‟ unions (Gitelman 1988; Tone 1997).                                                              
It must be emphasised here, as has Brody (2001: 365), that JDR Jr. harboured 
“deeply amibivalent, unresolved feelings about organized labor” as is clear in a letter 
to Mackenzie King in April 19, 1921. Regarding his International Labour Review 
paper, „Cooperation in Industry‟ which was originally titled „Democracy in Industry‟, 
JDR Jr. wrote: 
You will note that I have used the title DEMOCRACY IN 
INDUSTRY… please tell me quite frankly whether you think I 
have introduced the idea of democracy with sufficient frequency to 
adequately connect the paper with the title (RFA Economic Interest 
Series, Box 13, Folder 99, RAC).  
In May 1 he sent another letter saying: 
I finally adopted as a title COOPERATION IN INDUSTRY. The 
word “Cooperation” does not suggest to my mind as it does to 
yours, a relationship with Profit Sharing. …I felt it a safe title to 
use and really a safer one than DEMOCRACY IN INDUSTRY, 
which to my mind would more generally be regarded as indicating 
control rather than cooperation by Labor with Capital (RFA 
Economic Interest Series, Box 13, Folder 99, RAC).  
Though he wanted a public perception of him and his famous employee 
representation plan as being pro-union, ultimately JDR Jr. could never bring himself 
to accept unions as the workers‟ principal bargaining unit, largely if not entirely 
because he was completely, yet comfortably indentured to his father‟s wishes, and his 
father was vehemently against unionisation of any of the family businesses. In the 
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early 20
th
 Century, most business leaders and a good deal of other social groupings – 
including workers - were united in their fear of and opposition to trade unions, 
regarding them as part of the problem rather than the solution to industrial peace and 
prosperity (Gitelman 1988; Kaufman 2000b, 2008). In this way, 
Rockefeller‟s defense of the open shop was as conventional and 
derivative as most of his views. The union was an organization of 
outsiders and agitators that, through intimidation and false 
promises lured otherwise contented employees into conflict with 
their employers. The union‟s object in fomenting trouble was to 
increase its dues paying membership, thus enriching the leadership. 
These perfectly selfish ambitions endangered the interests of both 
the employer and his employees (Gitelman 1988: 15). 
 
He firmly believed he was morally justified in not dealing with unions so long 
as any number of workers in his family companies were not members of same. 
Indeed, operating in industries requiring huge fixed capital investments and the need 
for seamless coordination of interconnected and complex technology, JDR Jr., like 
most other industrialists, feared unions for the legitimate threat to profits and survival 
posed by their craft organisation, restrictive work rules, and conflict orientation 
(Kaufman 2008).  
Accordingly, and wary of the negative experience of union accommodation at 
the progressively managed National Cash Register company, the 1915 Rockefeller 
Plan - whereby employees directly elect their own representatives to joint committees 
or councils with management to discuss employment issues - was a union avoidance 
strategy, though one achieved through union substitution, rather than union 
suppression. In contrast to more conservative businessmen who embraced such plans 
solely as an anti-union device, JDR Jr. intended his plan to beat unions at their own 
game by promoting greater employee involvement, improving communication and 
coordination, and providing a spectrum for dispute resolution. In other words, JDR Jr. 
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endeavoured to foster greater cooperation and unity of interest between the company 
and workers, thereby increasing productivity, firm competitiveness, and the basis for a 
mutual-gain outcome, what today is called the „high-involvement‟ or „high-
performance‟ model of HRM (Rees 2009; Taras 2000; Kaufman 2000b, 2008).  
Yet despite the fact that, on net, such employee representation plans benefited 
workers and broader society in general (Kaufman 2000b), and specifically, CFI 
miners and steelworkers were much better off than they might have been in the 
absence of the Plan (Rees 2007), company unions did not afford workers the freedom 
to act independently of management, as the latter tended to control the course and 
result of deliberations. Though unreflective of the Rockefeller Plan, a US Department 
of Labor study in the mid-1930s found that of 592 employee representation plans in 
operation, 40% of them had never called a meeting of representatives or their 
constituents: a sure sign that these were employer-dominated shams (Rees 2009). 
“Neither Rockefeller nor King were able to look at the distribution of power under the 
Plan from the worker‟s perspective and see how this affected their willingness to 
express themselves freely and openly to management” (Rees 2009: 66). At CFI 
managers stage-managed the whole affair, initiated the plan, oversaw the nominations 
and balloting, and most importantly, because the scheme was „joint‟, gave 
management veto rights and simultaneously discouraged any independent voice by 
workers‟ representatives. They retained the rights to hire, to fire, to manage company 
property, and to supervise work (Patmore 2007; Brody 2001; Gitelman 1988). For 
workers whose hopes of worker-initiated organisation had ended with the cessation of 
the strike, the Rockefeller Plan offered more than no plan at all and by voting for its 
adoption, “they were guaranteed the diluted spirit of collective bargaining, if not the 
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union mechanism they would have preferred to give that spirit more potent 
expression” (Tone 1997: 120).  
Against the implicit wishes of its architect, Mackenzie King, JDR Jr. 
“welcomed the Industrial Plan as a substitute for unionisation rather than a transitional 
step in the evolution to collective bargaining” (Taras 2000: 311; Hogle 1992; 
Hallahan 2003; Rees 2009). In fact, it is probable that most employee representation 
plans introduced in both Rockefeller-owned and other companies were introduced 
precisely to ward off trade unionism (Scheinberg 1966; Gitelman 1988; Tone 1997). 
For this reason the Rockefeller Plan was openly criticised by AF of L president 
Samuel Gompers and also by Frank Walsh, the chair of the 1915 US Commission on 
Industrial Relations, as “sham representation”. Walsh believed that unless workers 
were allowed to choose their own representatives and collectively bargain with 
employers, then autocratic management would corrupt political democracy itself, a 
point that would ultimately shape the progressive Taylorists‟ evolving 
conceptualisation of industrial democracy (McCartin 1997: 28-29; 49-54), as 
discussed in the first part of the paper.  
Moreover, despite the fact JDR Jr. had ample opportunity – beginning with 
CFI - to recognize unions as legitimate bargaining agents for his own employees, he 
simply could not bring himself to do so. Early in 1919, his advisors Mackenzie King 
and Raymond Fosdick urged him to grant union recognition at Rockefeller-owned 
businesses. King drafted a concrete plan for how collective bargaining and employee 
representation might coexist and suggested that unions be consulted regarding the 
installation of the employee representation plan at a Standard Oil (Indiana) refinery. 
JDR Jr. ignored their counsel and was, in fact, chagrined by the suggestion (Gitelman 
1988; Brody 2001). Similarly and in the same year, during a strike at the Minnequa 
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Steelworks in Colorado, JDR Jr. refused to intervene and recognise the strong push by 
the workers for unionization and the rejection of the employee representation plan, 
and instead gave his support to the company management (Patmore 2007). Finally 
and perhaps most enigmatically, during the second of President Wilson‟s Industrial 
Conferences called to end the 1919 Steel Strike, JDR Jr. – in tandem with vice-chair, 
Herbert Hoover – secured conference endorsement of the need for employers and 
workers of the country to develop his employee representation scheme (Gitelman 
1988). With this major triumph, he subtly and skillfully engineered the transfer of 
industrial relations from the public and political realm to the private and economic 
realm, from the sphere where people allocate power to where money holds sway. As 
Harvey (1988: 41; italics added) further notes:  
The privatization of industrial relations reversed the policy of the 
Wilson administration before and during the war which encouraged 
both Rockefeller-style shop councils and union growth. …The 
widespread belief that modern society was moving toward worker 
control within industrial democracy was…dispelled.  
 
Victory over labour in the field of industrial battle was essential to the 
maintenance of JDR Jr.‟s unitarist-managerial employee representation initiative that 
retarded worker control and engendered corporate discipline (Harvey 1988). But, 
more importantly, it was also essential to JDR Jr.‟s psyche. As Gitelman (1988: 306; 
parentheses added) notes: 
Fosdick, and Mackenzie King as well, …failed to perceive how 
profoundly Rockefeller‟s self-esteem was bound up with the 
Colorado Industrial Plan. He could not abandon employee 
representation without endangering the personal independence  or 
the leadership standing he had gained as its advocate. …He could 
not compromise (the Plan) without compromising himself.  
 
What his advisers saw as a social issue was deeply personal and moral to JDR 
Jr. and a pivotal reason for his refusal to recognise outside unions.  
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This all said, however, it is important to note that though employee 
representation and other welfare capitalist practices used at CFI and elsewhere were 
intended as union substitution strategies, they should not be condemned as inherently 
and universally anti-social. Indeed, and as noted above, on the whole not only were 
they welfare-enhancing, giving shopfloor workers „voice‟ and improving their lives, 
but also probably a preferable (albeit employer-created) form of industrial democracy 
to the alternative of often corrupt, bureaucratic, and autocratic or else elitist, „warring‟ 
craft unions, personified by the AF of L (Kaufman 2000a). They were an important 
step in the progressive evolution of management thinking and policy away from the 
„commodity‟ model of labour and toward a more humane and participative model 
(Kaufman 2000b, 2008). In this context, JDR Jr. needs to be judged both in relation to 
his contemporaries as well as in terms of his ultimate mission; compared to other 
captains of finance and industry, he was a modest liberal, and he conceived of and 
pitched his Plan to workers and wider society as a means to achieve a more permanent 
industrial peace which, though unrealised, was a legitimate part of the so-called 
Progressive movement (Rees 2009).  
Turning now to Mayo, extant accounts of Mayo‟s rhetorical strategy overlook 
the fact that he was specifically reacting to proposals for union-management 
cooperation and industrial democracy advocated by progressive members of the SM 
movement. But as we have just discussed, given his reliance on Rockefeller funding, 
he was also shrewdly playing the tune his benefactor wanted to hear. His portrayal of 
workers as irrational, agitation-prone masses susceptible to socialistic ideas and his 
advocacy of the need for a managerial elite to govern them was a very attractive 
proposition to conservative big business who felt their authority under threat in the 
immediate postwar period onwards. As Witte (1954: 14-15) notes: 
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The appeal of the Hawthorne experiments and…the “human 
relations” approach of Elton Mayo lay in the hope they seemed to 
offer of being able to avoid the dreaded unionism, then “in the air”, 
by appealing to and working with smaller groups to be found in all 
establishments. That was by no means Mayo‟s central idea, but in 
the troublesome times of the thirties it was the application of 
emphasis upon the importance of the group in securing results 
desired by management which accounted for much of its 
popularity. 
 
So it was therefore, as Baritz (1960) observes, that in all his corpus of ideas 
Mayo only twice referred to unions: once one when he highlighted that they were 
resistant to change, and again, when he said that they organise for conflict rather than 
cooperation. And for Mayo, cooperation, or what he called “spontaneous 
cooperation”, meant labour should do as management stipulated. In this context, 
Sheppard (1950: 91) astutely highlighted that spontaneous cooperation does not 
include collective bargaining; it does not mean union-management cooperation. The 
type of organization valued by spontaneous cooperation is vertical not horizontal, 
which implies the company union.  
Mayo and his HRS followers frowned on unions, favouring as bargaining 
units “small, spontaneously formed factory groups coordinated by private industrial 
elites” (Schatz 1996: 91). The presence of independent unions implied a high degree 
of conscious or unspontaneous and formal activity among workers and between 
themselves and managers. Collaboration would not be effective in such a situation 
because conscious processes of decisions diluted chances for conformity to a code of 
behavior congruent with company objectives (Ibid.). As Sheppard (1950: 91; 
parentheses in original) continued: 
That these objectives are determined by a top segement of the 
manager group Mayo and company neglect to make clear in their 
recommendations for spontaneous cooperation. Uncritical 
acceptance by the workers of the orders and goals of management 
is part and parcel of their submission to spontaneous cooperation. 
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...Cooperation in the Mayo perpective is a relationship involving 
happily unorganized (nonunionized) workers who unthinkingly and 
ethusisatically comply with the wishes of management.  
 
Bendix (1956: 40) similarly observed: 
Cooperation in industry is identified by Mayo with society‟s 
capacity to survive; and this belief is akin to, if not identical with, 
the ideal of cooperation which inspired the employee-
representation plans and the open-shop campaign of the 1920s. 
Mayo‟s neglect of trade-unions and of their role in industry is well 
in line with the open-shop campaign also, for in this campaign 
employers were not only fighting unions, but also introducing 
many measures designed to forestall them by satisfying the 
demands of workers in line with managerial objectives. 
 
But Mayo‟s antipathy to unions was more than mere kow-towing to JDR Jr. 
and belied a theory of democracy privileging a “scientifically trained” minority elite 
leadership and precluding the need for mass participation in political, economic or 
management decisions beyond those at the ballot box. In this way, Mayo simply 
leveraged one strand of two very different politico-cultural approaches to American 
scientific thought and practice: elitist and populist. Mayo and HRS rode the wave that 
saw the professionalization and appropriation of science by experts and specialists 
(read academics and management executives) away from grassroots civil society 
(O‟Connor 2008b).  
In espousing such a view, Mayo was in good company. As Pateman (1970) 
has noted, the “contemporary” theory of democracy espoused by theorists such as 
Joseph Schumpeter, Robert Dahl, and others - as opposed to the classical liberal or 
“participatory” theory of Rousseau, Bentham, J.S. Mill, or G.D.H. Cole - downplays 
the participation of the „masses‟ and the virtues of socialisation and political efficacy 
engendered thereupon by participation in all spheres of social life, particularly in 
industry. On the contrary, she argues, “it is the participation of the minority elite that 
is crucial and the non-participation of the apathetic, ordinary man…that is regarded as 
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the main bulwark against instability” (Pateman 1970: 104). To be sure, the apathetic 
„masses‟ are deemed to be unfit for anything more than selecting leaders at the ballot 
box, as they tend to harbour non-democratic sentiments that might undermine the 
consensus on the norms of the democratic method itself (Pateman 1970).  
Mayo took great exception to the participatory conception of democracy, 
particularly in industry, espoused by G.D.H. Cole (Bourke 1982). While he agreed 
with Cole‟s overall thesis concerning the need for autonomy and majority rule in the 
political sphere - that citizens in a polity should be to be ruled by elected 
representatives of their own free choice - Mayo did not believe this should extend to 
worker‟s choosing their own representatives in industry. Democracy for Mayo was a 
form of government rather than a social condition. In other words, he did not believe 
that for a democratic polity to exist it is necessary for a participatory society to exist 
(Pateman 1970). For Mayo this conflated the moral or civic function of the citizen-
voter with the technical function of the professional or expert in industry: 
A question of public morality is necessarily determined in a 
community…by the given level of morality the community has 
achieved; and in matters of morality every individual must be 
judged equally. But a scientific question can be determined only by 
the most skilled investigator; and in this case the opinion of one 
man may outweigh that of all the other members of the community. 
Cole‟s suggestion of quasi-parliamentary control in industry 
entirely disregards the fact that industries resemble “professions” in 
that they are skilled communal functions. In all matters of social 
skill the widest knowledge and the highest skill should be 
sovereign rather than the opinion of “collective mediocrity”. …The 
outstanding failure of democracy is its failure to appreciate the 
social importance of knowledge and skill (Mayo 1919: 57; 59).  
 
It is not difficult to see why this view was far more appealing to business 
leaders such as JDR Jr. than, say, Ordway Tead, Mary Parker Follett, or Mary Van 
Kleeck‟s espousal of worker involvement in workplace decisions as essential to the 
attainment of democracy in wider society.  
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Conclusion 
In this paper we have tried to get to the heart of why and how, despite the 
embrace of industrial democracy and mutual-gains partnership with organised labour 
by a small, but progressive arm of the SM movement, this fact is continually ignored 
by the bulk of the literature and the entire Taylorist project continues to be 
demonized, whereas HRS was and remains largely deified. How did this happen and 
who stood to gain? A partial answer provided here, is the complex web of power and 
influence revolving around JDR Jr., his closest advisors, and the „father‟ of HRS, 
Elton Mayo. Notwithstanding the hazards of imputing motive, each player in this 
network had something personal, moral, and/or financial to gain.  
As we noted above, JDR Jr. believed himself and his family as stewards of a 
divine financial and philanthropic trust and, intuitively, agreed with the idea that 
power is the production of intended effects, and so strived to produce only desirable 
effects (Gitelman 1988). So it was, therefore, he solicited the services of Mackenzie 
King and sponsored the career of Elton Mayo, both of whom by all accounts craved 
financial stability and influence. Indeed, in the socioeconomic realm, we prefer to 
believe that figures like JDR Jr., who wield enormous power, have interests and and 
ends towards which they shape their means accordingly. To discover that JDR Jr. may 
have been manipulated in terms of the narrow and self-serving definition of these 
means and ends is disquieting, as Gitelman (1988) has noted. The latter also notes that 
both King and JDR Jr. were engaged in self-deception and, in particular, that JDR Jr.  
did not seek as he claimed „a fair deal for the working man‟. His 
interest in employee representation can most chariatbly be 
characterized as one of industrial peace at any price, save 
unionization. He did not care for the workers or their welfare but 
only for their acquiescence (Gitelman 1988: 337).  
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For his part, Mayo surely had his patron in mind when he conceptualised 
business leaders as a natural elite, possessing the ability, and so, the right to rule the 
rest of the nation. His work presented businessmen with solutions to their concerns 
about labour strife and the viability of the American socio-economic order amidst the 
threat of economic downturn, industrial conflict, and alternative political ideologies 
and class conflict. Further, he offered them elite membership of a fraternity of 
benevolent leaders (Baritz 1960; Rose 1978; O‟Connor 1999a, 1999b). It is little 
wonder then that 
Mayoism emerged rapidly as the twentieth century‟s most 
seductive managerial ideology. What, after all, could be more 
appealing than to be told that one‟s subordinates are non-logical; 
that their uncooperativeness is a frustrated urge to collaborate; that 
their demands for cash mask a need for your approval; and that you 
have a historic destiny as a broker of social harmony? (Rose 1978: 
124). 
 
In this context, Harris (1996, 62-63) notes that the “unitarist-corporatist, 
vehemently antistatist industrial relations strategy” of union avoidance exercised by 
JDR Jr. and the conservative business community the 1920s, would ultimately find 
expression in the HRS in the 1930s and beyond. Similarly, as both Kaufman (2004) 
and Lichtenstein (2004) note, this would continue into the 1950s and 60s in the guise 
of the Kerr-Dunlop industrial relations study that “devalued collective action, 
marginalized the role of government, and heightened the centrality of the managerial 
elite as the „initiatior‟ and „manipulator‟ of the industrial system”. To be sure, the 
entire high-involvement model of employee voice in the post-WWII era was shaped 
by a narrower managerialist agenda focused on productivity and firm performance 
rather than the earlier, pre-WWII model which had emphasised collective dealing 
with employees (Taras 2000). 
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In this way, Mayo provided the conservative business community with a 
sound body of intellectual prize-fighters who would support them when they launched 
their post-New Deal campaign to win back the “Right to Manage” that they believed 
had been challenged during this era (Harris 1982) and who would ensure their 
undemocratic demands were painted not in the language of authoritarianism but that 
of humanism. Mayo justified managerial authority in corporations as the natural order 
of things, reconciling it with democratic ideals by asserting that the individual was the 
fundamental unit on which all legitimate cooperative organization is founded. The 
same social contract melding citizens in the polity provided the model for the bond 
between the individual and the business firm. The corporation, together with the 
managerial authority it necessitated, could thus be represented as the perfect 
embodiment of the democratic ideals of the complex individuality that constituted the 
distinctly American way of life. Managerial authority did not hold society down; 
rather, it held it together: the agitation-prone masses were deemed unfit for 
cooperation and had to be acted on by an elite leadership nurturing vital non-logical 
impulses amongst work-groups in order to stabilise their emotions for accepting 
responsibility (Rose 1978; Bourke 1982; Harvey 1988; Miller and O‟Leary 1989; 
Miller and Rose 1995; O‟Connor 1999a, 1999b).  
In this struggle, the progressive Taylorists and their activist concern with 
democratizing workplaces and engaging in détente with organised labour were 
ultimately defeated, leaving the business community in control of the discipline‟s 
applied, theoretical and historical knowledge. This development, we believe, needs to 
inform those management scholars currently seeking to re-establish a critical tradition 
within the discipline. 
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